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There are no red icons!
Aug. 26th, 2019 03:42 amПриветствую!
Вынесу из комментариев к вот этому посту уважаемого![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
afirsov.
Есть такая интересная американская статейка (на самом деле - магистерская диссертация): Taylor C. 'The Transformation of Reconnaissance - Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield', 2005
Несколько сочнейших цитат:
Since the size and composition of the enemy said little about his capability or his intent, commanders found that this type of detailed information that often flowed down from satellite imagery, UAV surveillance, or passive reconnaissance efforts was essentially meaningless.
Colonel Perkins commented that, “the majority of intel that the brigade actioned off of came from tactical units.” Lieutenant Colonel Ferrell, commander of the division cavalry squadron for the Third Infantry Division, commented that higher-level G2s provided very little intelligence to the squadron. The vast majority of intelligence he used was generated by his own formation. This sentiment is echoed over and over again by other battalion commanders.
Major General Marks, C2 for CFLCC observed what he called a “break in the system” somewhere between the battalion and division level. Information moved relatively easily between CFLCC, V Corps, and the divisions because of the large bandwidth capabilities of these headquarters. However, at the brigade and battalion level this information “bottle-necked” down to only what could be transmitted over a voice radio net. Major General Marks summed up this sentiment with the comment, “At the battalion level, it is a bump in the night.”
И, наконец:
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, S2s quickly discovered that the size and the quality of equipment of a particular enemy unit told them very little about the severity of resistance they might encounter. Time and again, large conventional formations would crumble in the face of American assault while small bands of Iraqi irregular offered intensely fierce resistance. In this context, an icon was essentially meaningless because it told a commander very little about what type of enemy contact he could expect or what the enemy’s intention was. Despite the considerable effort and resources devoted to reconnaissance, the enemy simply would not fit any easy template. Lieutenant Colonel Lee, G2 for Fourth Infantry Division, summed up the frustration of many in the intelligence community when he declared in his interview that “there are no red icons!”
С уважением, Dargot.
Вынесу из комментариев к вот этому посту уважаемого
afirsov.Есть такая интересная американская статейка (на самом деле - магистерская диссертация): Taylor C. 'The Transformation of Reconnaissance - Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield', 2005
Несколько сочнейших цитат:
Since the size and composition of the enemy said little about his capability or his intent, commanders found that this type of detailed information that often flowed down from satellite imagery, UAV surveillance, or passive reconnaissance efforts was essentially meaningless.
Colonel Perkins commented that, “the majority of intel that the brigade actioned off of came from tactical units.” Lieutenant Colonel Ferrell, commander of the division cavalry squadron for the Third Infantry Division, commented that higher-level G2s provided very little intelligence to the squadron. The vast majority of intelligence he used was generated by his own formation. This sentiment is echoed over and over again by other battalion commanders.
Major General Marks, C2 for CFLCC observed what he called a “break in the system” somewhere between the battalion and division level. Information moved relatively easily between CFLCC, V Corps, and the divisions because of the large bandwidth capabilities of these headquarters. However, at the brigade and battalion level this information “bottle-necked” down to only what could be transmitted over a voice radio net. Major General Marks summed up this sentiment with the comment, “At the battalion level, it is a bump in the night.”
И, наконец:
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, S2s quickly discovered that the size and the quality of equipment of a particular enemy unit told them very little about the severity of resistance they might encounter. Time and again, large conventional formations would crumble in the face of American assault while small bands of Iraqi irregular offered intensely fierce resistance. In this context, an icon was essentially meaningless because it told a commander very little about what type of enemy contact he could expect or what the enemy’s intention was. Despite the considerable effort and resources devoted to reconnaissance, the enemy simply would not fit any easy template. Lieutenant Colonel Lee, G2 for Fourth Infantry Division, summed up the frustration of many in the intelligence community when he declared in his interview that “there are no red icons!”
С уважением, Dargot.
