Французские взводы огневой поддержки мотопехотных рот начала 2000-х

[dargot]

Приветствую!

(ссылка на оригинал видео - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=icw2nZevooI)

Видна, как мне кажется, "колониальная" направленность тогдашней французской армии - взвод явно предназначен для качественного усиления мотопехотных взводов высокоточным дальнобойным огнем тяжелой снайперки и ПТУРов. Хирургическое средство, качественно превосходящее основного противника - ополчения с автоматами и РПГ-7.

Хотя взвода с двумя БТР для 1 тяжелой снайперки и 2 расчетов ПТУР многовато, ПМСМ. Могли бы просто дать им 3 VBL，по одной на каждое огневое средство.

С уважением, Dargot.

Comments

[andreasbauriedl.livejournal.com]

In just a few short years, the structures of French combat units have undergone constant changes.

This has also resulted in a fragmentation of personnel and resources.

I'll skip over the disappearance of the "battalion" in the early 1960s (except for the "Chasseurs Alpins" or Alpine Troops). What we now call a "regiment," with 4 companies (infantry) or 4 squadrons (armored troups), actually corresponds only to this vanished combat unit. This represents a reduction by a factor of three or four compared to its former strength.

In contrast, the Bundeswehr retains this designation, which is more accurate.

Below that level, while the company or squadron hasn't changed much, it's primarily at the platoon level that we see a kind of "shrinkage."

For a standard/regular infantry platoon, three combat squads of 12 or 13 men each, plus a command group, this amounted to just under fifty men. For a motorized ("porté) platoon of an armored unit or mechanized company, there were four AMX-13 armored personnel carriers (one per quad with 13 seats), totaling 52 men including crews. This provided support from the vehicles, with four 20mm cannons, specifically the T20/13 (now "recycled" onto the VAB armored personnel carriers), plus four coaxial machine guns.

A few years later, the same unit was equipped with three AMX-10Ps, carrying a total of 33 men, including crews. This amounted to only three 20mm cannons and three coaxial machine guns.

Cost-cutting reasons ? It's also true that liaison soldiers within the command squad were no longer necessary with the presence of radios (one per squad plus one for the platoon leader), the mechanic was assigned to the company/squadron repair unit, and the three snipers were distributed among the squads. Therefore, the command squad was reduced to the bare minimum: the platoon leader and his radio operator.

Due to reduced personnel, the previous 5-man "fire team" (1 team leader, 2 soldiers for the machine gun crew, 2 for the ATGM crew) was reduced to 2 (the gunner of one weapon being the loader of the other). Thus, either the machine gun or the ATGM was disembarked, not both. An absurdity ! How could anyone anticipate the type of threat encountered after disembarkation and during the flanking maneuver, when vehicle fire support was located far behind ?

Within an infantry squad, initially composed of 2 teams ("fire" and "shock"), the structure evolved to pairs ("bonômes"), then units of 3... and so on.

A new mindset: resources are provided, but not the corresponding personnel. Only what is necessary is used, depending on the threat. This mindset is evident here.

Another key idea: the reduction in personnel is offset by an increase in firepower.

But what happens in case of losses ?

Recent experiences show that "large battalions", armies with numerous personnel, possessing at the same time a large (and very diverse) firepower, are making a comeback on the battlefield, because it is being rediscovered that "fire kills" and that as a result, personnel "melt away", but here not for reasons of economy.

Cheers.

[andreasbauriedl.livejournal.com]

Regarding the term "colonial," it's important to know that a French politician, Chirac, seeking to appeal to young voters, decided in 1997 to abolish the system of "military service" or "conscription," dating back to 1795. This system required young men to spend a certain amount of time undergoing military training (a civic "duty" that then formed a mobilizable "reserve"), and to replace this "army of the Nation" with a professional army.

This was a way to immediately reap the "peace dividend" at a time when the end of History was being predicted ... Therefore, the forces were significantly smaller, but composed of highly competent, even elite, soldiers.

In a way, the country's defense, within the framework of a "traditional" war, relied solely on the nuclear deterrent, while the ground "battle force," thus greatly reduced, could be deployed on short-range missions (such as in Africa, for example) or in very low-intensity conflicts.

While the adversaries encountered on the ground often had numerical superiority, they rarely possessed cutting-edge weaponry or extensive combat experience.

I'm leaving aside the case of Afghanistan, from which perhaps not all the (good) lessons have been learned.

From this perspective, I accept the somewhat pejorative term "colonial", or rather "post-colonial" ...

[dargot.livejournal.com]

Bonjour!

This is a general trend: when infantry forces around the world began to be widely equipped with armored vehicles, the increasing demands for the armament and protection of IFVs led to a sharp reduction in the actual number of infantrymen in infantry platoons and companies.

Cordially, Dargot.

[dargot.livejournal.com]

Bonjour!

I have doubts about the effectiveness of a conscript army as a means of preparing a reserve. If the need arises to mobilize young people who recently served in the army, then yes, it works. But considering that, for political reasons, they now try to avoid doing this, those who served 15 or more years ago have already forgotten everything.

Regarding the French army — it seems to me it has one of the best structures in the world for low-intensity conflicts — company-structured regiments, specialist light armored vehicles, and the Foreign Legion, after all...

Cordially, Dargot.